

# Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding

> Return address P.O. Box 16950 2500 BZ The Hague The Netherlands

To the Chairman of the Lower House of the States General  
P.O. Box 20018  
2500 EA THE HAGUE  
THE NETHERLANDS

## Policy and Strategy Department

Oranjevuitensingel 25  
2511 VE The Hague  
P.O. Box 16950  
2500 BZ The Hague  
www.nctb.nl

## Our reference

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reference in your reply. Please  
only discuss one subject in  
your letter.*

Date 17 December 2010  
Subject Thirteenth Progress Report on Counterterrorism

## 1. Introduction

Last June, the Lower House of Parliament received the twelfth progress report on counterterrorism.<sup>1</sup> With this letter I am presenting you the thirteenth progress report. The report discusses the progress made in the development and implementation of the different elements of the anti-terrorism policy during the past six months. These elements concerned, in succession: combating radicalisation, international co-operation, creating decisive tools and organisations, human rights, and taking security measures. Just as in the twelfth report, this report also includes a selection of themes that are relevant at this moment, from a political, social, or policy planning point of view or which are notable for other reasons. This does not mean that no progress has been made in relation to other themes, but these have already been set in motion and are proceeding well enough.

As usual, the progress report will first give a summary of the most recent Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands. The Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands is drawn up four times a year by the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, who is also responsible for this report.

Finally, I am enclosing the third monitor report from the Research and Documentation Centre on the Dutch Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorism (Extended Powers) Act.

## 2. Summary of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands of December 2010

In the past period, there were several developments which were alarming in the light of the Dutch Threat Assessment. Firstly, the Netherlands was mentioned several times as a potential target for an attack, by leaders of both the Pakistan Taliban and the Afghan Taliban, and, alongside several other countries, in the English-language jihadist web magazine 'Inspire'. This confirms the fact that the Netherlands has a high international profile: Jihadists consider the Netherlands a

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<sup>1</sup> Lower House of Parliament, session year 2009-2010, 29 754 no. 190.

legitimate target, as a result of alleged discrimination of Muslims and perceived blasphemy of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad in our country.

Secondly, jihadist groups and individuals showed once again that they did not only have the intention to hit Western targets, but that they also have the intention to carry out these attacks in Western countries. Saturday 11 December in Stockholm a car was detonated and the suspected perpetrator blew himself up near a busy shopping street. On 29 October, two package bombs were found in Dubai and the United Kingdom which had been sent by Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP) to Jewish institutions in Chicago. In September, a Chechen attempted to have a letter bomb delivered in Copenhagen to the newspaper that had published the famous Muhammad cartoons in 2005. Als a jihadist network with possible connections to the Netherlands was uncovered in Belgium. This last group did by the way not pose a threat to the Netherlands. As early as in August 2010, the 22nd edition of Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands pointed to the fact that various jihadist groups related to al-Qaeda had been increasing the number and the pace of their activities, and that they were also aiming at Western targets.

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The developments referred to above took place against the background of various, sometimes confusing reports about terrorist threats against various European countries. These reports, which were often based on unconfirmed information, created the picture of a general and acute threat. In addition, a special development was seen in Greece. Early in November, Greek anarchists sent fourteen package bombs to government leaders of France, Germany, and Italy, to several embassies in Athens, and to some international organisations, including EUROPOL and EUROJUST in The Hague. A fifteenth package, which was never found again, was possibly addressed to the Dutch embassy in Athens. Nearly all packages were intercepted in time. Some exploded without causing much damage because of lack of sufficient explosive material. Although the targets selected indicate an international orientation, the package bomb campaign must mainly be viewed in a national Greek political context.

A consistent factor in the threat assessment is the limited threat from internal jihadist networks. In addition to this, the Netherlands – in comparison with other European countries – only has very few people who have travelled to jihadist conflict areas. There is currently no threat from returned jihad travellers. The resistance in the Netherlands against violence based on ideological motives remains as high as ever.

The threat level is the result of considerations that involve the weighing up of the various national and international factors affecting this level. Up to now, these considerations have resulted in the conclusion that the threat level will remain 'limited'. This means that the risk of an attack is currently relatively low, but it can certainly not be eliminated altogether. The dynamics around the developments outlined above are, however, considerable. Further negative developments in the near future may therefore give rise to a different assessment and a different threat level.

### **International context of jihadist threat**

*The core of al-Qaeda has weakened but is still resilient*

As a result of ongoing attacks against its position, the core of al-Qaeda has continued to be an organisation that is considerably limited in its freedom to move, and in its communication possibilities. In the past few months, armed

forces once again killed several prominent leaders. In addition, it seems to have become more difficult to broadcast media messages. There were fewer messages from the top two leaders, Osama Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, than in previous periods. Prominent websites disappeared or were taken off the air. On the other hand, however, in some cases, eliminated leaders were quickly succeeded by effective new individuals, and the core of al-Qaeda was still found to be encouraging and supporting other jihadists.

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*Perceived anti-Islam attitude of Western countries has played into jihadists' hands*

In the past few months, the debate about the position of Muslims and Islam was often conducted in sharp terms, as was the case in Germany, the United States (the discussion about the Islamic centre near 'Ground Zero' in New York), and France (among other things within the context of the burka ban). In various Western countries, we also noticed an increase in populist political movements, which were opposing what they called the 'Islamisation' of the West. The controversy about the position of Muslims and Islam in the different Western countries was given much media attention in many Muslim-majority countries, often with negative overtones. Media coverage on these issues feeds the narrative of the jihadists who place their actions in the context of a perceived bipolar world in which 'the West' is aiming to conquer and destroy 'the Islamic world'. The atmosphere of increasing antagonism and polarisation may result in a larger readiness of jihadists to take action and to strike Western targets. In Western countries this may result in growing tension among population groups.

**Developments in the most important jihadist conflict areas**

*Increased activity of jihadist groups in Asia and Africa*

Jihadist groups increased their activities in various jihadist conflict areas. In many cases, this resulted in attacks on Western targets and abductions of European citizens. *Afghanistan* and *Pakistan* continue to be of great importance to jihadists who have found safe refuge in these countries. In the North and South of Afghanistan, the NATO is more and more frequently confronted with fighters from the Haqqani network. This network has a key role, because it maintains contact with different terrorist networks. For the time being, the Pakistan Taliban appear to be taking advantage of fact that the army is focusing on relieving the distress following the floods in August 2010. In the meantime, the tension between the United States and Pakistan rose, because the US is fighting out the war against the insurgents more and more frequently on Pakistan territory. This has led to victims occurring among Pakistan soldiers and citizens. In *Iraq* the violence increased recently. A resurrection of the Islamic State of Iraq, of which 'Al-Qaeda in Iraq' (AQI) forms a part, is feared. The end of the American military mission and the difficult political situation in which the country finds itself, have given extremists more room. In *North Africa* 'Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb' (AQIM) has continued to be very active. In September, seven people were abducted in Niger, including five French citizens. In addition to the usual demands, such as ransom and the release of detained fellow-fighters, AQIM made a political demand in return for the release of the hostages: withdrawal of the intended burka ban in France. AQIM furthermore increased its activities to the south, and it may be involved in the fight of the violent Boko Haram movement in Nigeria. *Yemen* is still seen as one of the most important jihadist conflict areas. The 'Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula' (AQAP) that is active there has continued its attacks on government agencies and officials without abatement. In addition, the number of attacks on international targets in Yemen increased. A convoy of the British embassy was attacked in October for the second time this year. AQAS is also

considered the organisation behind the bomb packages that were intercepted on 29 October. These packages were on their way to Jewish institutions in Chicago. It is expected that the number of small-scale attacks on Western targets will increase further. The situation in *Somalia* remains extremely unstable. In the past period, the jihadist al Shabaab organisation struck hard, for instance, with the attack on a hotel that was visited by many MPs and officials, and attacks on peacekeeping troops of the African Union (AMISON), and on the transition government.

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### **Threat against Western countries**

#### *Many news reports about high terrorist threat in Europe*

In the past period, there were various reports about threats against countries in Europe. These reports were not always consistent and were consequently confusing. Many of the reports appeared to be based on the interrogation of Ahmed Wali Sidiqi, an Afghan German, who had been arrested in Afghanistan in July 2010. He was talking about plans to carry out attacks in several European capitals. The Netherlands was not mentioned in this interrogation. France stated that the threat had never been so high. This was mainly due to activities of AQIM, which considers France its most important Western enemy. Sweden increased its threat level in connection with the risk of returning jihadists. In mid-November, the German government stated to have concrete indications of an imminent attack in Germany later that month.

#### *Terrorist incident in Denmark*

Denmark became involved in a terrorist incident when an explosion took place in a hotel in the centre of Copenhagen. The cause was a bomb that exploded prematurely. The attacker was a Chechen residing in Belgium, who had contacts with radical Muslims in various European countries. He admitted he had wanted to send a letter bomb to the 'Jyllands Posten', the newspaper that published the famous Muslim cartoons in 2005. Since then, the newspaper, its employees, and cartoonist Westergaard have been the targets of attacks (or intended attacks) several times.

### **Threat against the Netherlands**

#### *International profile of the Netherlands remains high*

The international profile of the Netherlands is still high. Jihadists consider the Netherlands a legitimate target, as a result of alleged discrimination of Muslims in the Netherlands and due to the many 'blasphemous statements regarding the Prophet', which allegedly occur in or from the Netherlands. Developments in the Netherlands, such as the government formation, and activities and statements of Wilders, leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV), were given broad coverage by mainstream media in Arabic countries. Islamic and jihadist websites also paid much attention to these developments. The tone of the articles was mostly hostile, but there were not any concrete threats on those websites against the Netherlands or Dutch people in the past period. The Netherlands was, however, mentioned as a potential target, together with several other countries, in the autumn edition of the English-language jihadist web magazine 'Inspire'. The involvement of the Netherlands in the war in Afghanistan will also continue to contribute to the high international profile for some time to come. It is true that the mission in Uruzgan has ended, but there is still a small number of military personnel present as instructors or in management positions. Jihadists continued to perceive the Netherlands as a companion in the coalition of 'crusaders' against Islam.

#### *The Netherlands mentioned as a target*

In the past period, the Netherlands was mentioned as a potential target of an attack on various occasions, for instance, during an interview with Wali ur Rehman, a leader of the Pakistan Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, TTP). He stated that his organisation would attempt 'to teach the Netherlands a lesson' with priority, because the Netherlands was allegedly making new laws against Muslims again and again, and because it was allegedly making Islam look ridiculous. Unlike the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistan Taliban have international ambitions. The organisation was involved in the terrorist cell that was dismantled in Barcelona in January 2008 (with branches in other countries including the Netherlands), and in the foiled attack on Times Square in New York on 1 May 2010. There are, however, no indications that the TTP would be making preparations for an attack against the Netherlands or against Dutch interests abroad.

A spokesman of the Afghan Taliban, Zabiullah Mujahid, furthermore warned the Netherlands, in an interview with *de Volkskrant*, with a direct connection being made between the position of PVV-leader Wilders with regard to the minority government of Rutte-Verhagen. If Wilders would succeed in manipulating parliament to adopt 'more anti-Islamic legislation', the Netherlands would be considered for an attack. A new contribution to the NATO mission in Afghanistan would also turn the Netherlands into a hostile country. Mujahid was explicitly asked for his opinion about the Netherlands, so he did not issue the warning spontaneously. In the case of the Afghan Taliban as well, there are no indications pointing to the fact they would be making preparations for an attack against the Netherlands or against Dutch interests abroad.

#### *Jihad travellers*

A potential threat against the Netherlands does not only come from networks that operate internationally, but also from activities of persons who travel to jihadist conflict areas and who might use their experience in actions against Dutch targets there or, upon return, in the Netherlands itself. The number of 'jihad travellers' is, however, very small, certainly when compared to those in countries as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden. They mainly seek participation in the jihad in the areas they travel to, not to wage the jihad in the Netherlands. The number of persons who returned is also very small. They currently do not show any signs of posing a threat.

#### *Internal networks*

Internal jihadist networks have been aimless and without a leader for a long time. These networks currently do not show any signs of posing a threat.

### **Violent radicalisation and Polarisation**

#### *Violent incidents at houses of worship*

In the past few months, there were incidents of daubing, vandalism, and arson at several houses of worship in the Netherlands (Moluccan churches and several mosques); in one incident in Dordrecht someone had shot at the mosque door with a firearm. In respect of all these incidents, the attackers and their motives are unknown, so that it cannot be established whether ideological motives were playing a role.

#### *Increased polarisation*

The previous Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands stated that polarisation was becoming a growing phenomenon in the Netherlands. In this context, the

discussion about Muslims and the position of Islam in the Netherlands was said to play an important role. There were vehement discussions on this theme in the past few months, in particular on the Internet. The political constellation during and after the formation of the government also caused many reactions on the Internet, but large-scale demonstrations and protest actions did not take place. A new phenomenon was that radical Christians made anti-Islamic statements and delivered flyers to various mosques in the country. The Arab European League (AEL) was furthermore convicted in appeal for publishing a cartoon suggesting that the Holocaust is a Jewish fantasy. The conviction itself caused reactions about being wronged from AEL itself and from the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT). In the same period, the Public Prosecution Service decided not to prosecute cartoonist Gregorius Nekschot for discrimination. AEL and HuT, but also many others considering the number of reactions on the Internet, regarded this as unequal treatment and discrimination of Muslims.

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## **Resistance**

### *High resistance against violence based on ideological motives*

Although a limited number of violent extremist incidents occurred, the resistance of the Dutch population against violence based on ideological motives remained high in general. This also applied to Dutch Muslim communities. This was confirmed by a study of the University of Amsterdam into salafism in the Netherlands. The connection between strict orthodox Islamic views and the legitimisation of ideologically oriented violence is weak to moderate. In this context, the conclusion should furthermore be drawn that there is a gap between the legitimisation and application of violence. The study confirmed the view of the General Intelligence and Security Service and the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism that the salafist community in the Netherlands does not constitute a breeding ground for jihadist terrorism.

### *Resigned reactions on coalition agreement and tolerance agreement*

On Islamic websites, the reactions on the coalition agreement between the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the tolerance agreement of both parties with the PVV were relatively resigned and moderate. The As Sunni Mosque in The Hague, which in the past came to the public's attention because of its inflammatory and radical statements, acted with extreme composure. They expressed their concern, because 'anti-Islamic views' would be forming part of government policy, but they stated that the Islamic community would continue to aim its efforts towards a peaceful society and mutual respect and understanding 'despite all opposition'. The statement tempted a few 'posters' on salafist websites to criticise the moderate course of the As Sunni Mosque.

### *New revisions of the jihadist doctrines*

In the past period, a number of remarkable revisions of the jihadist ideology were published. The principal revision in national context was that of Jason Walters, the member of the Hofstad group who had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of fifteen years. In a letter in *de Volkskrant* of 16 October 2010, he stated that he had come to recognise that his ideals had become lost and were 'ethically bankrupt'. He turned against the arbitrary violence and the simplistic global view of islamists. He called on them to put down their weapons and to establish social and political parties. He referred to the ideal of an Islamic state on the basis of the Sharia to be no longer in line with modern times. Revisions of the jihadist

doctrine may play an important role in the prevention of radicalisation and the repentance of people who have already been radicalised.

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### **Countermeasures**

*Combating terrorist financing and deportation of foreign nationals proves, in practice, to be a complex matter*

In the area of countermeasures, it became clear during the past period that both the combating of terrorist financing and the deportation of foreign nationals who might be linked to terrorism is, in practice, a complex matter. The legal complexity and the reasons for placing people or organisations on the so-called EU Freeze List received much attention in the last few years due to various judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union. This Court was critical about the listing procedure and the way in which the rights of listed organisations or people were respected. The Court of First Instance of the European Union recently declared a number of decisions of the Council of the European Union to freeze the funds of the Dutch Al Aqsa Foundation invalid. Al Aqsa was placed on the EU Freeze List in 2003. The Netherlands has appealed the judgment. In respect of another organisation, the IHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation), it appeared that various European countries had assessed this organisation in different ways. The German authorities closed an office of IHH for funding Hamas. Germany considered Hamas to be an umbrella organisation whose humanitarian activities could not be viewed separately from terrorist and political activities. This was contrary to the view of several other countries, which did make the distinction in this context.

The deportation of foreign nationals who have been related to terrorism sometimes came up against legal objections which related to Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). If there are substantial reasons to suspect that someone shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in his country of origin, this article prohibits deportation. In July, the European Court of Human Rights prohibited the deportation by the Netherlands of a Libyan citizen who was suspected of terrorist activities and who had relied on Article 3. In its decision, the Court emphasised that it was well aware of the problems encountered by the states in protecting their citizens against terrorist violence, but that also under the most difficult circumstances, such as counterterrorism, Article 3 of the ECHR was to apply in full, in conformity with established case law of the Court.

#### *Developments in various legal proceedings*

In October, the legal proceedings regarding the Hofstad group were resumed. The Court of Appeal had to assess again whether the Hofstad group was an organisation with terrorist aims. On 3 November, the Public Prosecution Service demanded sentences up to seventeen years' imprisonment (in the case of Jason Walters). The Dutch citizen of Iraqi origin, Wesam al Delaema, was released after a decision of the Rotterdam Court. This Court converted the prison sentence of 25 years which Al Delaema had received in the US to Dutch standards. Delaema had received a sentence for preparing attacks against American troops in Iraq. The Court arrived at 8 years imprisonment, taking account of the poor circumstances during his detention in US. Given the duration of the pre-trial detention and the imprisonment itself, Al Delaema was released immediately. The American Minister of Justice stated to be very disappointed in the decision. The Public Prosecution Service submitted to the decision. Finally, the Public Prosecution Service

dismissed the case against four young people from The Hague who had been arrested in Kenya in July 2009, for lack of evidence. The young people had been on their way to Somalia. The Dutch authorities had suspected them of participating in a terrorist organisation and preparing a terrorist crime. One of them, who was allowed to await the objection against the deportation to Morocco in the Netherlands, has been released by now.

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### 3. Combating violent radicalisation

#### 3.1. Internet

The vulnerabilities for cyber attacks against and through the Internet increased and became known to a broader public. A *National Cyber Security Strategy* was developed in close co-operation between the ministries most concerned, partly in view of the terrorists' possible use of the Internet as a weapon or a target.

New IT solutions do not only pose threats, but also opportunities. At the beginning of 2010, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism gave the go-ahead for a *National Programme for the Recognition of Digital Information and Fingerprinting*. The purpose of this programme is to identify existing and new initiatives that may be contributory to the application of fingerprinting techniques. Fingerprinting is a collective term for techniques used for automated recognition of moving or static images and backgrounds, and matching the data on the Internet. Such techniques may also be useful in combating cyber crime and terrorism. This programme will run until mid-2012.

#### 3.2. Research

##### *Social trends around radicalisation processes*

In the period from October 2009 up to July 2010, Prof. drs. P. Rademaker, of the University of Amsterdam and drs. E. van de Linde, of Erik van de Linde Innovatie Advies conducted the study *A Foresight Study into the Influence of Broad Social Trends on Radicalisation Processes (Een toekomstverkenning van de invloed van brede maatschappelijke trends op radicaliseringsprocessen)*. The purpose of this study was to investigate, on the basis of an initial memorandum and the structured questioning of a group of experts (Delphi method), the relationship between possible trends that determine the future, and radicalisation and terrorism. Out of the large number of trends suggested, the experts considered only a small number of trends relevant to radicalisation and terrorism. The experts considered the following trends as the most important: increased hate against Israel, politicisation of Islam, growth of jihadist networks, demographic explosion, shortage of raw materials, 'failed states', and dysfunctional governments. Many of the trends added by the experts are in line with or are the result of fast and drastic global shifts: 'orphaned states', anti-Western thinking in new world powers, underestimation of the power of religion, technology, ecological migration, and shortage of drinking water as a result of environmental degradation.

The study is a confirmation of the trends that could affect the terrorist threat in the long term. The study, for instance, rightly drew attention to the role of the media in terrorism and in counterterrorism, the dangers of increased polarisation, various demographic developments, a threatening shortage of raw materials, and the security risks to which 'failed states' might be exposed. Notable in this study is the attention paid to new technologies, both as an opportunity and a threat to counterterrorism. On the one hand, technology may be used as a weapon or in selecting targets. On the other hand, technology may be used to counter terrorist

threats in an advanced way. Technological developments have been integrated into Cyber Terrorism policy to an increasing degree.

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#### *Salafism in the Netherlands*

The recently published study *Salafism in the Netherlands: Nature, Scope, and Threat (Salafisme in Nederland: Aard, omvang en dreiging)*, conducted by I. Roex, S. van Stiphout, and J. Tillie of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam, outlines the large diversity in the salafist communities in the Netherlands. Salafism is typified as an 'ordinary' orthodox movement. Its followers appear to have a rigid view of the world and maintain strict rules of life. In this context, they are always judging each other and there is hardly any room for dissidents. Some people were found to have problems participating in society, but not all of them; some salafists even proved to have strong relationships with society, to show great political participation, and to have adopted a critical attitude. In addition, the researchers observed resistance in the salafist communities against too strict compliance and profession of salafism in the Dutch context. All preachers attached to salafist organisations denounced the use of violence, and refuted the jihadist ideology. Radicalisation, within the meaning of the readiness to use violence, is consequently a development that occurs outside the salafist organisations. The study is in line with the views of the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the General Intelligence and Security Service, i. e. that the salafist centres currently do not constitute a breeding ground for jihadist terrorism

As the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Kingdom Relations, the former Minister of Justice, and the former Minister for Housing, Communities and Integration communicated in their letter *Salafism in the Netherlands (Salafisme in Nederland)* to the Lower House of Parliament on 22 January 2010<sup>2</sup>, this means that organised salafism in the Netherlands no longer needs to be the subject of active government policy. As indicated in the presentation letter of this study of 24 September 2010<sup>3</sup> to the Lower House of Parliament, it continues to be important to make a differentiation within the salafist spectrum, and not to consider the salafist movement as a whole to be a security problem. On the other hand, the study confirmed the necessity to continue to carefully monitor the margins and developments within this orthodox spectrum, and to intervene as soon as the limits are exceeded. The central government has supported the local authorities in their approach to radicalisation within those margins. The local approach includes repressive, preventive, and curative measures. In addition, the General Intelligence and Security Service is conducting a study into organisations or persons in respect of whom there are sufficient grounds for suspecting them to pose a danger to the continued existence of the democratic rule of law, to public security, and to other vital interests of the state.

#### **4. International developments**

##### *4.1. European co-operation*

At the end of July, the European Commission adopted the Communication on EU counterterrorism policy in which it mainly looked backed upon its achievements in

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<sup>2</sup> Lower House of Parliament, session year 2010-2011, 29614 no. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Lower House of Parliament, session year 2010-2011, 29754 no. 194.

the last few years at the European level in the area of counterterrorism, as far as legislation and policy is concerned.

Besides looking back, the Commission also looked ahead in its Communication. Although the Commission announced that it would be proposing new legislation in a number of areas in the next period, it kept its options open with regard to the details of the actual implementation of such legislation.

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The government welcomed this Communication and, in principal, a large number of the policy initiatives and intentions that were included in the Communication. It subscribed to the horizontal importance ascribed to the protection of human rights as set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Communication lacked a mention of a number of subjects, which, in the opinion of the government, should be high on the European agenda in the coming period. The government stated it would like to see attention being paid to an increase of 'security awareness' and performance by professionals at the European level, similar to what is being done in the Netherlands within the framework of the Counterterrorism Alert System. The government will make efforts to achieve this as well as the evaluation of European legislation.

#### *4.2. UN Counterterrorism strategy*

In September 2010, the member states of the United Nations (UN) reconfirmed the UN Counterterrorism Strategy during the second Review Conference. This UN strategy had been adopted unanimously by the General Assembly of the UN in 2006, and constitutes an important framework for the work of the UN member states and the UN itself in the area of counterterrorism.

In its report on the implementation of the UN Counterterrorism Strategy, the Secretary General of the UN provided proper insight into the implementation of all facets of this strategy. The Secretary General established that the UN had considerably enhanced multi-lateral co-operation in the fight against terrorism, but that it still required further improvement. The report outlined the following three recommendations. Firstly, the knowledge of the strategy must be strengthened among UN member states and UN agencies. Secondly, the report strongly advocated the strengthening of partnerships between the UN on the one hand and the member states, relevant international, regional, and sub-regional organisations on the other hand. Finally, the report stated that a comprehensive approach to terrorism remains crucial, and that the four pillars of the strategy should be implemented simultaneously. The final element of this comprehensive approach would be the realisation of the *Comprehensive UN Treaty against international terrorism*. The Secretary General called on all member states to make every effort to ratify this treaty.

#### *4.3. Terrorism lists*

##### *National*

By designation orders of 8 June 2010<sup>4</sup>, the assets of six individuals who were being suspected of being members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE c.q. Tamil Tigers) were frozen. The LTTE is on the EU terrorism list. The six individuals were, in particular, suspected of participation in a criminal

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<sup>4</sup> Government Gazette 2010, nos. 9224, 9227, 9229, 9233 up to and including 9235.

organisation, participation in a terrorist organisation, and violation of the Dutch Sanctions Act 1977. In addition, four of them were suspected of violating the Dutch Betting and Gaming Act, money laundering, and international crimes, such as recruiting child soldiers.

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#### *Revision of the UN SR sanction lists*

In conformity with Resolution 1822 of the UN Security Council, the Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee (the 1267 Committee) of the UN Security Council checked all names on the consolidated list. The result of the checking was that 45 names were removed from the list.

On the basis of Resolution 1904, the names on the sanctions list will be revised annually in the future. On the basis of this resolution, the lists will also be checked as thoroughly as possible every six months, to determine whether the list contains names of individuals who have died in the meantime.

In addition, the procedural safeguards concerning the sanction lists have been strengthened. On the basis of Resolution 1904, for instance, the Ombudsperson, the Canadian Kimberly Prost, started her duties on 12 July 2010. By now, she has taken up her first case. The Ombudsperson also has her own website: [www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson](http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson).

## **5. Tools and organisation**

### *5.1. Security Awareness & Performance*

By means of its Security Awareness & Performance Programme (SA&P), the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism supported companies and institutions with vital functions for Dutch society in enhancing security awareness, both on the shop floor and at managerial level. In addition to the physical and security measures required, such as entrance cards, cameras, and locks, watchful employees also make significant contributions to security. As a result of this, disturbances in business operations due to actions of, for instance, criminals, vandals, extremists or terrorists may be prevented. In order to stimulate the security awareness of employees, the workshop *Zeker van je Zaak* was developed in co-operation with the Police Academy and TU Delft. In this progress report, special attention is paid to the results of this project.

The workshop *Zeker van je Zaak* gives executives an effective tool to teach their staff what they should pay attention to and how they should act in the case of deviant behaviour by using a variety of teaching materials. *Zeker van je Zaak* was brought to the attention of security professionals by means of four 'train the trainer' sessions. During these sessions, the participants are provided points of reference to help them roll out the workshop within their own organisations. The security professionals then give the workshop internally to their own employees.

A total of 386 trainers from 217 companies participated in the 'train the trainer' sessions. The companies came from many different branches of industry, including sectors such as chemicals, natural gas, nuclear power, electricity, telecommunication, drinking water, the financial sector, airports, seaports, urban

transport, regional public transport, tunnels and water-restraining structures, hotels, public events, and public authorities.<sup>5</sup>

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In order to be able to continue to offer the *Zeker van je Zaak* workshop on a structural basis, an e-learning module for security professionals is being developed. It will then be possible to download the required material from a website. The e-learning module and the digital teaching material will be available early in 2011.

In connection with the *Zeker van je Zaak* workshop, an effect measurement was carried out. The security-awareness level of the company, the employees, and the security professionals was measured through the eyes of the security professional before the rollout of the workshop (this was adopted as the baseline measurement: the "nil" measurement). This baseline measurement showed, among other things, that employees often were not interested in Security Awareness, and that the security professionals did not have sufficient information material at their disposal. The security awareness level after the rollout of the *Zeker van je Zaak* workshop is currently being measured (the so-called "one" measurement). The results of the effect measurement will be available early in 2011.

#### *5.2. Airport security*

At the end of October, several security incidents occurred abroad in relation to cargo planes with shipments from Yemen. As a response to this, the Netherlands announced that it would take the precautionary measure of prohibiting the transport of cargo and mail originating from Yemen to the Netherlands or shipment from the Netherlands to Yemen. At the European level, discussions are being held to arrive at an agreement on a common European approach. The Lower House of Parliament will be informed of this through the standard channels.

#### *5.3. CBRN terrorism*

The coordinated efforts at the national level to minimise the risk of CBRN terrorism, as announced in the previous progress report, are going according to plan. The efforts include measures to increase resistance at high-risk CBRN research agencies (2008-2013), the realisation of one point of contact for both *security* and *safety* of biological agents (mid-2011), and an international (globally oriented) bioterrorism exercise (see below). Finally, the Netherlands has put itself forward as a candidate for the Presidency of the Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 2011. The formal decision-making process will take place in December 2010 at the meeting of the States Parties.

#### *5.4. Exercises*

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<sup>5</sup> In order to provide an indication of the scope of the project: for the purpose of the 'train the trainer' sessions, the participating companies ordered in total approximately 1,300 basic sets of the course material and approximately 12,500 exercise books. Out of this number, more than 100 basic sets and approximately 1,000 exercise books of the English version have been ordered.

The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and INTERPOL have organised the globally oriented BIOSHIELD GLOBAL exercise to take place in November 2010. This exercise will be aimed at the prevention (or threat) of biological terrorism. Participants from different disciplines (e.g. health care, police, and intelligence services) will be practising international cooperation and information exchange to prevent abuse of biological agents. The preparations are going according to plan: 17 countries and 6 international organisations have confirmed their participation. This exercise fits in with a series of international CBRN/E exercises that are aimed at establishing *Trusted Communities* at the international level: Cobalt 2009, in the area of radiological/nuclear terrorism (within the context of the so named Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)) and the possibilities for a new exercise in 2011 are being explored. Within the context of the Security Awareness & Performance Programme, the degree of resistance of locations of the Counterterrorism Alert System and CBRN agencies will be tested in practice.

#### 5.5. Home-made explosives

Terrorist and other criminal organisations have the potential and unabated intention to use explosives. In nearly all terrorist attacks in Western Europe, the attackers used home-made explosives, which may have serious consequences. Home-made explosives are considered the most appropriate weapon because the components (specific chemical substances) and knowledge are freely available. Recent examples are the attempted attacks in Oslo, New York, Detroit and the Sauerland Gruppe. In order to prevent attacks with home-made explosives, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the General Intelligence and Security Service, the Military Intelligence and Security Service, the National Police Services Agency, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, the Explosives Ordnance Disposal Service, the Joint Taskforce Counter-IED of the Ministry of Defence, the Netherlands Forensic Institute, and the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment are working in close co-operation with several other government agencies such as the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service. The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism also co-operates with corporate partnerships or associations of representatives from the corporate sector.

In September 2010, the European Commission presented a draft Regulation intended to reduce the availability of high-risk chemical substances to private individuals.<sup>6</sup> This could be realised by making it more difficult to sell specific chemical substances above specified concentrations to private individuals, and to impose the obligation to report suspect transactions. The legislation and implementation following this Regulation is being discussed and fleshed out in detail, in close co-operation with the above-mentioned corporate sector and representatives thereof, both at the European and the national level. The legislative measure proposed will be accompanied by voluntary measures taken by the industry and retail sector, with a view to improved security and awareness across the entire chain. The intended Regulation also proposes the obligation to realise a reporting centre for (potential) suspect trade in chemicals. The Netherlands made a start with the realisation of this reporting centre as early as in 2009, and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment and the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism has asked the Fiscal Information and

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<sup>6</sup> COM (2010) 473.

Investigation Service / Economic Investigation Service, the Department of International Police Information of the National Police Services Agency, and the National Investigation Service to continue this reporting centre. The Lower House of Parliament will be informed of the government position on the draft Regulation in the short term.

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With respect to a new explosives-related police system, a solution is being sought along two trails. On the one hand, the National Police Services Agency, in co-operation with the Netherlands Police co-operation facility (vtsPN), is working on a solution to improve the relevant police processes. Parallel to this, the Netherlands Forensic Institute - on the instructions of the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism - is working on a provisional short-term solution for the most important co-operating organisations; this solution must be operational in 2011 at the latest.

The Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment will review the legislative system around explosives for several reasons, including the advice of 2007 from the Advisory Council on Hazardous Substances. It is expected that early in 2011, a legislative process will commence in order to simplify existing legislation, to realise better alignment with the practice, and to prescribe security aspects by law.

## **6. Security measures**

### *6.1. Individual threateners*

Events such as those on Queen's Day 2009, and more recently, the incident during the State Opening of Parliament, are an illustration of the problem that may be caused by individual, often confused threateners, who act on their own. International research also revealed that a large number of the attacks against politicians was carried out by non-ideological motivated individual threateners who acted on their own. For this reason, the *Individual Threateners* Project was started recently. This project is currently being implemented. The first step to be taken will be the establishment of an *Individual Threateners Pilot Team* within the National Police Services Agency before 1 January 2011, in accordance with the intention announced by my predecessor in office.<sup>7</sup> The purpose of this pilot project is to develop an approach to individual threateners of persons in respect of whom the central government has a special responsibility and decides to take additional security measures. This approach is based on the assumption that, in specific cases, the provision of care will result in a reduction of the threat and improved risk management. Key task of the team is co-operation between the Intelligence, Security and Police services and the care sector. As far as the responsibilities, duties, and powers in the different stages (process) of the approach to individual threateners is concerned, the existing legal frameworks will apply. Secondly, a research project will be initiated to investigate the manner in which unknown threateners carry out attacks and the possibilities of early identification. In addition, research will be conducted into the models used for, for instance, needs and risk assessment, in order to be able to optimise the working procedures of the Individual Threateners Pilot Team with the National Police

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<sup>7</sup> Lower House of Parliament, session year 2009-2010, 754 no. 191 dated 1 July 2010.

Services Agency. An evaluation of the new approach and the working procedures of the team will be carried out in due course. Finally, it is currently being examined whether it is possible to discourage the so-called - often younger - 'abusive threateners' by means of an information and awareness campaign. The Pilot will be evaluated after two years, with the intention to give this working procedure a permanent role, if it has proved to be successful.

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The Minister of Security and Justice,

I.W. Opstelten